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Abstract 
From the right to information to the right to privacy, from freedom of expression to protection from 
defamation, online conflicts are troubling private entities and jurists alike, particularly as the ever-increasing 
spread of global communications changes the meaning and impact of territories and jurisdiction. Beneath the 
hubbub runs a babbling brook of values, as pervasive and persistent as they are hidden.  Religiously rooted 
conceptions permeate our legal decisions even as technological approaches are proposed as solutions. In this 
vein, a recent legal decision of the CJEU ordering Facebook to remove posts adjudicated as defamatory has 
mostly been analyzed in terms of content filtering technology. The essay argues, however, that true import of 
the case lies in the largely unattended cultural motors that are silently and perhaps inadvertently determining 
social paths. These religious and cultural values extend tendrils across global platforms through blunt decisions 
that lack the nuance to address potential impacts. At risk is a detachment between law and common sense in 
which fundamental human rights are not only unprotected, but not even acknowledged.  Changing this state 
of affairs requires a more sophisticated cultural awareness that leverages the semiotic potential of legal 
instruments to deliver interculturally aware solutions. 
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Summary: 1. The case: Ewa Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited – 2. Religion in the rafters – 3. Defamation: 
where words and actions, opinions and facts, collide – 4. The hammer of equality – 5. Italy: a case study – 6. Magic filters 
and global takedowns – 7. Conclusion 
 
 
1. The Case: Ewa  Glawischnig -Piesczek v.  Facebook Ire land Limited  
 
On April 3, 2016, an anonymous user with the username “Michaela Jaskova” posted on his/her 
Facebook page a link to an article from an Austrian online news magazine together with comments 
calling Austrian Green Party leader Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek a “lousy traitor” (miese Volksverräterin), a 
“corrupt oaf” (korrupterTrampel), and a member of a “fascist party” (Faschistenpartei).1 Ms. Glawischnig-
Piesczek filed both a criminal and a civil suit with the Austrian courts but only the civil case was 
																																																								
1 An informal translation of the full post text is offered by legal scholar Daphne Keller: “Lousy traitor. This corrupt oaf 
has never earned a single honest cent with real work in her whole life, but with our tax money is kissing the asses of these 
smuggled-in invaders to build them up into the most valuable of all. Let us finally prohibit this Green Fascist party.” 
Keller (2019). 
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successful. The Austrian court ruled that the post constituted defamation, and in addition to the 
removal of the post, ordered Facebook to proactively monitor and block both “identical” and 
“equivalent” posts in the future. The monitoring requirement was upheld on appeal. The case was 
then brought before the Austrian Supreme Court. The appeal centered on both the 
monitoring/blocking (filtering) requirement as well as a more contentious issue: whether Facebook 
must remove the post globally. Both the filtering and global takedown issues were referred to the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The Court was specifically asked to interpret the Directive on 
electronic commerce,2 which states that a host provider such as Facebook is not liable for stored 
information if it has no knowledge of its illegal nature or if it acts expeditiously to remove or to 
disable access to that information as soon as it becomes aware. However, such a host provider can 
nevertheless be ordered to terminate or prevent an infringement, including by removing the illegal 
information or by blocking access to it. Even so, the directive does not require the host provider to 
monitor generally information which it stores, nor to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating 
illegal activity. On October 3, 2018, the CJEU ruled that member states can indeed order a host 
provider (e.g., Facebook) to remove/block access to 1: content that has been declared to be unlawful, 
2: content which is identical to the original content (e.g. “re-posts”), and 3: content which is 
equivalent (e.g., a new post with only slightly different wording). It was also determined that in the 
execution of these blocking duties, the host provider should not be required to assign people to assess 
content, thus, automated search tools and technologies should be employed. While the judgement is 
in many ways unexpected, perhaps the most astonishing aspect is that it is to have worldwide effects 
within the framework of relevant international law. This means that nationally determined legal 
constraints on speech/expression can now potentially be imposed worldwide.  
The judgment has stirred up a veritable hornets’ nest of issues and legal debate regarding the 
competing rights of freedom of expression and protection from defamation, as well as several 
contrasting views on the capabilities of filtering technology. I would like to argue, however, that 
lurking beneath what may appear to be a rather classic conflict of competing rights is a complex web 
of interconnected cultural contrasts that is not being addressed and that could have rather dire 
effects. While the technology aspects of the case seem to be serving as shiny baubles of distraction, far 
more troubling is the newly legalized ability to impose value categorizations in the form of terms such 
as defamation, offense, insult, etc., on a global scale. The takedown of information based on these 
kinds of categorizations is essentially a form of censorship empowered by unspoken cultural 
frameworks. These cultural motors are silently operating behind decisions about what kind of 
expression is permissible and by whom. While the ECJ was asked to give an interpretation that was 
ostensibly about an Ecommerce directive, the reach of the decision goes far beyond commerce to 
impinge upon what is to be published (expressed and shared) globally, and not only. It also 
potentially prescribes monitoring activity that impacts everyone making use of social media platforms. 
In the case of Facebook, this affects 2.45 billion people in more than 60 countries. This massive 
impact is particularly important in light of the tremendous diversity that such reach inevitably 
																																																								
2 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’) (OJ 2000 L 178, p. 1).  
 
	
 
CALUMET – intercultural law and humanities review 
 
59 
	
encompasses. The cultural fabric that gives form and meaning to terms such as “reputation,” “insult,” 
“offense,” etc., cannot be said to be in any way globally consistent. Cultural determinations about 
what is offensive and what is not, where to draw the line between, for instance, freedom of speech 
and freedom of religion, are constantly shifting variables. The pervasive inconsistencies and 
disagreements within these domains have always been and continue to be sites of social conflict on a 
large scale. To give just one pithy example: while just a few years ago thousands took to the streets in 
defense of the freedom of French cartoonists to mock Islam in print, now, quietly, Austria can 
globally silence a citizen for having called a politician a corrupt oaf3. Is this an appropriate balance of 
rights? Is it even within the remit of a European court to answer the question for the rest of the 
world? How are values best addressed when it comes to legal impositions with global effects? 
 
 
2. Religion in the Rafters 
 
It may seem that religion per se is not at issue in this case. However, I would like to try to elucidate 
how it is impossible to consider the concepts of insult and defamation without addressing the values 
that shape their contours in any given cultural context. Though Ms. Glawischnig-Piesczek was not 
successful in her criminal case, nevertheless the civil case upheld the concept of defamation set down 
in the Austrian Criminal Code: “Accusing someone of a disreputable characteristic or disposition, 
dishonourable behaviour or of a behaviour offensive to good morals that may denigrate that person 
or bring him/her into disrepute in the eyes of the public.”4 Now, the concepts of disrepute, honor, 
denigration and offence to good morals have a provenance; they do not simply appear in the modern 
world as readily understood and agreed upon. In many European nations that provenance is deeply 
Christian, and Austria is certainly no exception. Austria, like the vast majority of European countries, 
is a secular state, meaning freedom of religion is recognized and citizens are not “born members” of 
any church. As has been articulated in a mounting collection of scholarship, however, secularity is 
much more complex than the simple notion of separation of church and state.5 The historical 
circumstances even of this separation always have a lasting and formational impact on how secularity 
is carried out within any given state. Even the briefest review of the religious history of Austria reveals 
the overwhelming impact of the Hapsburg Empire during the Counter-Reformation, which restored 
Catholicism as the dominant religion and left a legacy that remains today, with nearly 60% of the 
population self-declaring Catholic6. Regardless of the particular weight given to this social fact, the 
prohibition of “dishonorable behavior” cannot be understood without considering this historical-
religious context. To be clear: there is no simple causal effect in which Austria has made this decision 
because its population has a large Catholic majority. Rather, the prevalence of Catholicism is 
																																																								
3 The term used in the original German was “korrupterTrampel.” For a translation of the offending comment, see above 
at Note 1.  
4 http://legaldb.freemedia.at/legal-database/austria/ 
5 In a massive literature beginning at least in the mid 20th century and increasing daily, see indicatively Casanova (1994), 
Asad (2003), Taylor (2007), and Calhoun et al (2011).  
6 2017 data from the Austrian Catholic Church available at: 
https://www.katholisch.at/aktuelles/2018/01/09/statistik-2017-wieder-leichter-rueckgang-bei-kirchenaustritten 
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undeniably a part of a broader cultural fabric that informs what is considered offence to good morals 
in Austria. This is true for every social context, regardless of the particularities of its religious-cultural 
history. 
Judgments about what is good and therefore allowed, and what is offensive and therefore not 
allowed, are the scaffolding of all legal systems. It is therefore not surprising that there have been 
many legal cases, even limiting the view to Europe, in which the interplay among modern moral 
judgment, freedom of expression, and religious context are at issue. One of the most often cited of 
these cases, in fact, took place in Austria. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria is almost always cited when it 
comes to the contrast of freedom of speech and freedom of religion, perhaps because it is considered 
by many to be among the most controversial of the ECtHR cases regarding freedom of speech. A brief 
look at the case may help to illustrate some of the ways in which religiously rooted cultural 
manifestations operate as a determining part of legal decisions with potentially far-reaching 
implications. 
The Otto-Preminger-Institut was a private cultural association that offered audio-visual 
entertainment. In 1985, the association announced the screening of the film das Liebeskonzil 
(“Council in Heaven”), restricting the viewing public to those over 17 and advising in the adverts that 
the film contained caricatures of Christian figures and beliefs.7 Before the film was screened, criminal 
proceedings were brought against the association’s manager (Mr. Dietmar Zingl) by the public 
prosecutor, at the behest of the Catholic Church. The film was seized, Mr. Zingl was subsequently 
convicted of “disparaging religious doctrines,” and this conviction was upheld, in 1993, by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court’s reasoning was that Austria should be 
allowed a margin of appreciation for its religious cultural context. Among the main arguments made 
by legal counsel in Austria was precisely the religious-cultural context in which the film was to be 
screened. The ECtHR case documentation is clear: 
 
…they stressed the role of religion in the everyday life of the people of Tyrol. The proportion of Roman Catholic believers 
among the Austrian population as a whole was already considerable - 78% - but among Tyroleans it was as high as 87%. 
Consequently, at the material time at least, there was a pressing social need for the preservation of religious peace; it had 
been necessary to protect public order against the film and the Innsbruck courts had not overstepped their margin of 
appreciation in this regard.8 
 
There was another very similar case shortly after with a similar result, Wingrove v. UK9, in which the 
banning of a film found to be offensive to Christians was upheld by the ECtHR.  Though these cases 
are somewhat dated and have been criticized by legal scholars as an example of the misuses of 
																																																								
7 A description of the contents of the film is offered in the court documentation as follows: "Oskar Panizza’s satirical 
tragedy set in Heaven was filmed by Schroeter from a performance by the Teatro Belli in Rome and set in the context of a 
reconstruction of the writer’s trial and conviction in 1895 for blasphemy. Panizza starts from the assumption that syphilis 
was God’s punishment for man’s fornication and sinfulness at the time of the Renaissance, especially at the court of the 
Borgia Pope Alexander VI. In Schroeter’s film, God’s representatives on Earth carrying the insignia of worldly power 
closely resemble the heavenly protagonists. Trivial imagery and absurdities of the Christian creed are targeted in a 
caricatural mode and the relationship between religious beliefs and worldly mechanisms of oppression is investigated." 
See: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57897%22]} 
8 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria no. 13470/87 § 52 ECHR 1994. 
9 Wingrove v. UK no. 17419/90 ECHR 1996. 
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proportionality,10 I believe they are relevant here for several reasons. First, morality within cultures 
tends to move slowly. Even broad measurements of the role of religion in a given society such as 
church membership can only capture a tiny protruding tip of what are instead cultural depths filled 
with the multiple ways religiously rooted worldviews play out anthropologically. In other words, the 
relationship between a given culture’s religious profile, not only today but also historically, and the 
moral views that prevail in that same social context are entwined; these threads and the specific ways 
they tangle can end up being somewhat covert. Declared membership in a church is one thing, 
cultural habits and behaviors a much more pervasive other, even if there is unavoidable overlap. 
Second, if we consider the stated goal of the judgment, that is, the “preservation of religious peace,” 
we can interpret this as a desire for the aversion of conflict through the protection of people’s beliefs 
and feelings, which again, is deeply cultural. Precisely which of people’s feelings and beliefs, if any, are 
to be protected by the State varies considerably across the world’s legal cultures.11  
The Preminger case has been highlighted once more in the legal media of late thanks to a 2018 
decision of a 2010 legal case12, also in Austria, in which a woman was convicted for disparaging 
religious doctrines in publicly held seminars entitled “Basic Information about Islam.” During the 
seminars, which were advertised to young voters as “top seminars” in the framework of a “free 
education package” she stated, among other things, that Mohammed was a pedophile. The judgment 
was upheld by the European Court of Human rights which agreed with the Austrian courts that the 
defendant’s statements went “beyond the permissible limits of an objective debate” and constituted 
instead, “an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam,” thus legitimating legal interference with rights to 
freedom of expression. Assessing these cases in parallel we see a kind of consensus in Austria, 
supported by the European Court which also references several of their related cases13 that address 
the legitimacy of protecting religious feelings, the balancing of freedom of expression in light of the 
need to protect these feelings, and the importance of allowing for a wide margin of appreciation to 
States when it comes to maintaining social peace. This last is of special importance for the current 
Facebook case under analysis. The E.S. v. Austria judgment states: 
 
The Court notes at the outset that the subject matter of the instant case is of a particularly sensitive nature, and that the 
(potential) effects of the impugned statements depend, to a certain degree, on the situation in the country where the 
statements were made at the time and the context in which they were made. Accordingly, and notwithstanding some of 
the domestic courts’ considerations such as the duration of the marriage in question14, the Court therefore considers that 
the domestic authorities had a wide margin of appreciation in the instant case, as they were in a better position to evaluate 
which statements were likely to disturb the religious peace in their country.15 
																																																								
10 See Klatt, M. and Meister, M. (2012). 
11 I will address this in more depth below, but to offer a pithy preview of the core of the Facebook case, calling a politician 
a corrupt oaf is a daily occurrence in many countries.  
12 E.S. v. Austria no. 38450/12 ECHR 2018. 
13 In the judgment, the ECtHR cites a number of cases, including Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom, a very similar case regarding a film that was offensive to Christians in England and whose censorship was upheld 
by the ECtHR,  I ̇.A. v. Turkey, Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey, Giniewski v. France, Handyside v. the United Kingdom, Fressoz v. 
France, Baka v. Hungary, atakunnan Markkinapo ̈rssi Oy v. Finland, Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, Gündüz v. Turkey, Von 
Hannover v. Germany, and Medz ̌lis Islamske Zajednice Brc ̌ko v. Bosnia and Herzegovina  
14 This refers to the Prophet Mohammed’s marriage. 
15 E.S. v. Austria no. 38450/12 § 50 ECHR 2018. 
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The tendency to favor margin of appreciation for States in these cases comes from an underlying 
assumption that the State’s relationship to and legislation regarding religion is the result of the 
historical tradition and the social, moral and cultural circumstance of each country.16 This brings me 
to my third point. If there is European consensus that individual countries are in the best position to 
determine how to maintain religious (read: moral/social) peace in their countries, then how could the 
results of such efforts possibly be legitimately imposed globally? As more than one commentator has 
pointed out, the content which prompted this Austrian plaintiff to request a global take-down would 
not be qualified as offensive in many countries but instead be immediately dismissed by the Courts, 
especially because the comments made were about a politician, someone who has chosen to be in the 
public spotlight and therefore in many countries benefits from less “protection.”17 Defamation, in 
short, is neither simple nor a question of fact. 
 
 
3. Defamation: Where Words and Actions, Opinions and Facts, Collide 
 
The issue of defamation, whether associated with religion or not, has been troubling legal systems for 
quite some time. While there is much concern about whether such offences should be criminal (there 
appears to be quite a bit of consensus internationally that they should not) more complex still is the 
concern that excessive application of even civil penalties for defamation has what has been termed a 
“chilling effect” on free speech, provoking self-censorship among journalists or even citizens who wish 
to avoid potential legal consequences. Again, if it is worrisome to think about self-censorship in a 
given democratic state, what happens when the effect is global? Even looking only at Europe, in some 
States defamation is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment, in others criminal but only 
punishable by a fine, and in still others not criminal at all.18 Forcing multinationals to essentially carry 
out a sentence globally that does not have legal support globally is illogical at best. This observation 
does not even consider the far more complicated variations in what constitutes defamation in the first 
place. Indignation over hurt feelings? Insult? Damage to a “rightful reputation”? Whose definition 
should prevail?  
There are at least two other major facets to the legal tangles around defamation: veracity and 
incitement. Some States have differing legal provisions based on whether or not the statements 
assessed as defaming are deemed to be factually accurate or not. In yet another Austrian case, dating 
back to 1975, the ECtHR assessed whether the applicant Lingens, an Austrian journalist, should have 
been sanctioned for publishing comments in a Viennese magazine, applying the terms "basest 
opportunism”, "immorality" and an "undignified" behavior to the Austrian Chancellor. The Austrian 
Criminal Code maintained that the only acceptable defense for these statements was a proof of their 
veracity. Since they are, however, value judgments rather than facts, Lingens could not prove the 
																																																								
16 Martínez-Torrón (2019), 58. 
17 As a Portuguese Court of Appeal succinctly stated, “Freedom of expression constitutes one of the fundamental essences 
of modern democratic societies. In such societies, public debate and freedom of expression should enjoy 
increased protection when relating to political questions or politicians themselves.”  Cited in Ellis (2014), at Note 65. 
18 For a map showing the breakdown in Europe as of 2014, see Ellis (2014), 8. 
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truth of the statements. Mr. Lingens claimed that the impugned court decisions infringed his 
freedom of expression to a degree incompatible with the fundamental principles of a democratic 
society and the Court agreed. Unfortunately, the same careful reasoning of this case was not applied 
in Ewa Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Limited which failed to consider any of the nuances of 
the judgment upon which the CJEU’s subsequent judgment rests. Though the inclusion of 
potentially offensive and unpleasant content within the category of expression worthy of legal 
protection appears over and over in legal judgments, particularly within the case law of the ECtHR19, 
in this case the issue seems to have been overlooked altogether. The statements made about Ms. 
Glawischnig-Piesczek appear to be comprehensively value statements rather than statements of fact. 
While they may be objectionable on various grounds, they cannot be disproven on a factual basis. For 
the sake of comparison, in the US statements cannot qualify as legal defamation unless the statement 
made can be proven to be false and the person making the statement also knew their statement to be 
false. Defamatory statements which are labeled as opinion are protected by the first Amendment. 
Similar statutes exist in other European states and decisions have been made in several legal cases to 
support them. The ECtHR, for example, has repeatedly found a violation of Article 10 (Freedom of 
Expression) precisely in cases where a distinction between fact and value statement has not been 
made by national courts.20 In this cultural moment where “fake news” is such a ubiquitous concern 
should there not be more attention paid, rather than less, to any discernable differences between 
value statements and factual statements?  
I cannot let this dichotomy rest, however, without making a few observations about the way in 
which it, too, is problematic. A very brief historical reminder seems useful at this juncture. While it 
would appear to be the Enlightenment’s great gift to the Western world to replace the religious 
monarch with the monarchy of reason, this was not a clean break 21 . Though the leaps in 
understanding made through the profound scientific discoveries of the 17th and 18th century cannot 
be overstated, reason did not—because it could not—replace all other human ways of understanding 
and making the world. Both in terms of the everyday lives of people and the larger systems and 
structures developed to organize them, traditions, emotional ties, faith, transcendence and the 
unknown have always brought more than reason into play. From a political point of view, for all of its 
achievements, the secular world did not exterminate all things religious, replacing them with atheist 
views, for example. The fundamental guiding ideas we have about right and wrong and the myriad 
ways these ideas structure our societies do not come from reason (or atheism for that matter), and yet 
we frequently treat them as if they were factual. Agreed upon fictions such as the calendars we use to 
mark time or the determinations we make about the dividing line between childhood and adulthood 
become facts. Of course, it would be impossible to organize or regulate our societies without such 
categorical distinctions, irrefutably cultural though they are. One result, however, is that the 
																																																								
19 See Dichand v. Others, no. 29271/95 ECHR 2002, Scharsach and News Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine, no. 72713/01, 
ECHR 2005. Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria, no. 39394/98 ECHR 2013, among many others. 
20 See, Grinberg v. Russia no. 23472/03, ECHR 2005, Savitchi v. Moldova no. 11039/02 ECHR 2005 and Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. Austria, no. 58547/00 (ECHR) 2005. 
21 Nor has there been agreement about its characterization as a gift, as argued in the by now iconic work of Adorno and 
Horkhiemer (Adorno and Horkheimer 1972). 
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fact/value dichotomy is often not such a clear one22. While we can certainly establish laws and then 
determine, factually, whether the laws are being properly obeyed, the laws themselves frequently rest 
on unstable notions of comportment because comportment itself fails to remain strictly within the 
camp of reason or not-reason (whether this last is defined as emotion, faith, or anything else). It is 
precisely because religious viewpoints often straddle the traditional terrain of these domains that they 
are apt to throw wrenches into legal systems. 
I insist on the connection between the religious and values understood more generally because 
it is impossible to meaningfully isolate them. Secular states define themselves in response to religion 
just as non-partisan is a term that exists only through its reference to parties. Though the case this 
paper analyzes is about “defamation,” this is defined as “offence to good morals” and any meaning 
that may be attributed to the term “good morals” belongs to a social fabric with religious threads. It is 
an understatement to say that the cultural nature of human behavior makes it difficult to regulate 
within single states, so what are we to make of globally imposed regulation? The facticity of offense or 
not-offense to good morals is problematic, but at least it does not typically result in criminal sanction. 
There is another criterion, however, that is being increasingly applied to online behavior that does 
result in criminal sanction, namely, incitement.  
In 2016, the European Commission teamed up with some of the major online players 
(Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, You Tube) to create a guide to Human Rights for internet users which 
includes a code of conduct intended to counter illegal hate speech online23. The guide states: 
 
You are free to express yourself and access information online. The freedom to express and access information and 
opinions extends to those which may offend, shock, or disturb others as long as they do not incite discrimination, hatred, 
or violence. Public authorities must respect and protect this right, and any restrictions must pursue a legitimate aim in 
accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly given the technology companies involved, this position mirrors the US legal 
framework more than the European one(s), placing a premium on expression over offense. Instead, 
the line is drawn at incitement. While distinguishing words that are used in order to express ideas 
from words that are intended to provoke potentially violent actions makes intuitive sense, there 
remains a giant question mark when it comes to who, exactly, determines whether something is 
inciting and why/how. Though the word “incitement” was not used, all the way back in the Otto 
Preminger case, the Austrian Court argued that the seizing of the offensive film was justified by a 
pressing social need for the preservation of religious peace, and that “it had been necessary to protect 
public order against the film.”24 The implication is that showing the film would have incited people 
to acts of aggression or violence, and this despite the fact that it was a private for-fee screening limited 
to those over the age of 17, in other words, a cultural event that was easily avoidable by those who 
wished to avoid it. The more recent case addressing these issues, E.S. v. Austria, was decided using 
																																																								
22 Though I will address this in more depth below, this is admittedly an oversimplification of something that has been 
addressed by philosophers from the ancients to Gadamer in his signature opus (Gadamer 2013, 1975), Esser (1970), and 
beyond. Very little of Esser’s important contribution is available in English but see Prott (1978) and references therein for 
a contextual understanding and Mathis (2011) for a more recent legal analysis. 
23https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016804d5b31  
24 Otto Preminger Institut v. Austria, no. 13470/87 § 52 ECHR 1994. 
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much the same reasoning, stating in the Merits section of the judgment that expressions that are 
likely to incite religious intolerance, or seek to spread, incite or justify hatred based on intolerance 
cannot enjoy the protection of Article 10.25 Expressions that are potentially offensive to others (or at 
least their proliferation and rapid diffusion) would appear to have increased in the last twenty years, 
and still more relevant to the primary case under analysis in this paper, their dissemination is ever 
more rapid and vast. If, as the ECtHR has repeatedly reiterated, the sensitive issues of offence and 
incitement are best understood by State courts, how does Europe come to instead heedlessly 
propagate national rulings on a global basis and then delegate their execution to technology filters? 
Why does incitement to violence or hatred as a key determinant in the evaluation of freedom of 
expression play no role in this case? Why does the international consensus regarding the special 
treatment of political speech26 similarly receive no attention here? The expression that has been 
globally banned in this case was political, seems to have been intended to spark debate, and did not 
specifically encourage its readers to do anything other than not vote for the political party the 
politician represented. The consequences for the plaintiff seem to be quite minimal and she has since 
left politics of her own volition. The consequences for expression, international jurisdiction and the 
use of filtering technology, on the other hand, appear to be significant to say the least. 
Just one month before the decision, the Council of Europe published a study entitled, “Study 
on forms of liability and jurisdictional issues in the application of civil and administrative defamation 
laws in Council of Europe member states.”27 This study identifies the problem of “forum shopping” 
in defamation cases, which consists of plaintiffs selecting the court in which to bring an action based 
on the prospect of the most favorable outcome, even when there is no or only a tenuous connection 
between the legal issues and the jurisdiction.28 The study goes on to describe in detail what kinds of 
cases have illustrated this issue, what courts have done about it, Brexit and its impact on these cases, 
as well as what might be done to address all of the inherent problems, identifying 15 “Good Practice” 
points along the way for Courts to consider when dealing with forum shopping and problematic 
international cases generally. While the care and deliberation that clearly went in to this work is 
evident and to be appreciated, it seems that in one fell swoop, with Ewa Glawischnig-Piesczek v. 
Facebook Ireland Limited the ECJ has instead swept all these concerns off the table. All the 
considerations regarding how Courts should assess foreign judgments, when they should accept or 
refuse judgments, how to apply res judicata, how to enforce time constraints for cases to ensure justice 
is served, when and how to make use of forum non conveniens doctrine to make sure cases are heard in 
the best forum, all these Good Practices are essentially neutralized by the new ruling. The age-old 
questions regarding what levels of protection of rights and freedoms States should offer their citizens 
																																																								
25 E.S. v. Austria, no. 38450/12 § 43 ECHR 2019. 
26 In Lingens v. Austria the Court elucidates: “[f]reedom of the press furthermore affords the public one of the best means 
of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders. More generally, freedom of political 
debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the Convention. The limits of 
acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private individual. Unlike the 
latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both 
journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance.” Lingens v. Austria no. 
9815/82 § 42 ECHR 1986. 
27 Available at: https://rm.coe.int/study-on-forms-of-liability-and-jurisdictional-issues-in-the-applicati/168096bda9 
28 Ibid, 6. 
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have little bearing if one State can simply impose its decisions on the rest of the world. Group rights 
vs. individual rights become similarly moot; in this case the billions of people whose content will be 
patrolled and potentially censored by filtering technology have no say at all in these practices since 
they have been essentially disappeared by the rights of the Austrian plaintiff. As long as one European 
Court can be convinced that a right has been infringed, the sentence can be executed globally. One 
result is that the problem of forum shopping would appear to be exponentially exacerbated. Another, 
even more troubling outcome is the lack of possibility to engage in meaningful international legal 
dialogue addressing the balancing of rights, the need for culturally-aware communication and 
exchange, which up until this judgment seemed to be taking place through various channels.  
 
 
4. The Hammer of Equality 
 
As I have been trying to show, among the many troubling aspects of this case is the disregard for the 
inescapable cultural imposition that is empowered by the decision. In some respects, however, this 
disregard is almost to be expected. The act of imposing one solution onto other people without 
taking into consideration how social/legal/cultural contexts differ vastly from one place to another is 
an unfortunate defect of modern liberal democratic thinking.29 What is closest to us is always the least 
discernable to us. What is considered normal, good morals, just, is always the product of history, 
tradition, culture. It is only before an unavoidable counterclaim that we are compelled to question 
our own frameworks for understanding our assumptions, whether they relate to offense, incitement, 
just indignation, or anything else. The almost automatic quality of the decision comes from an 
inability to even imagine that in another context, claims that seem obvious may not be obvious at all.  
When one cultural position forces the other into submission, there can never be any meaningful 
understanding or exchange. There are many voices today declaiming the negative tone of much of the 
commentary online. There are many who are tired of the ubiquitous insults and loose relationship 
with truth in online political expression. The Austrian decision, therefore, could potentially have 
something to offer to a dialogue regarding online behavior and freedom of expression. Instead, the 
global imposition of the sentence has the effect of shutting down any possible interactions, not only 
about defamation online but, importantly, about international sanctions. Since the issues at hand are 
to do with freedom of expression vs. offense to values, it could be helpful to spend a moment on 
another case study of sorts that illustrates the dazzling-blinding effect of cultural mindsets. 
The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy occurred in 2005 when a Danish 
newspaper published 12 editorial cartoons mainly depicting the Prophet Muhammad.  The 
newspaper claimed that the goal was to foster debate about the criticism of Islam and self-censorship. 
Muslim groups in Denmark voiced concern, and eventually protests were held around the world, 
including violent demonstrations and riots in some Muslim countries. When interviewed by the New 
York Times about his decision to publish the cartoons, editor Flemming Rose stated that the 
publication of the cartoons as well as others that were anti-Semitic, was a case of “documentation, not 
																																																								
29 This is essentially a way of thinking that has infused many academic fields including of course Post-Colonialism, 
Anthropology and Political Theory, and as such one footnote cannot hope to do it justice. However, for a pointed and 
astute sociological analysis, see Bhambra (2007).  
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endorsement.” I believe it is worth quoting him more extensively because he so succinctly captures 
the equality-as-a-hammer I would like to describe. He states: 
 
Equal treatment is the democratic way to overcome traditional barriers of blood and soil for newcomers. To me, that 
means treating immigrants just as I would any other Danes .... Those images in no way exceeded the bounds of taste, 
satire and humor to which I would subject any other Dane, whether the queen, the head of the church or the prime 
minister. By treating a Muslim figure the same way that I would a Christian or Jewish icon, I was sending an important 
message: You are not strangers, you are here to stay, and we accept you as an integrated part of our life .... It was an act of 
inclusion, not exclusion; an act of respect and recognition.30 
 
Probably at least a volume could be written on the points I would like to make next, so please forgive 
the necessary brevity as I try to keep the argument aligned with the Facebook case under analysis. 
Nonetheless, it seems crucial to note, despite the regrettably cursory quality of these observations, at 
least two characteristics of Islam that contrast with Rose’s comments. First, the vast majority of 
Muslims are born into the religion, which like Judaism, has long been understood as an integral part 
of a cultural context. Children raised in these contexts are born within the religion, they are 
automatically a part of the religion, which means they are raised with the worldview, customs and 
tradition of the religion.  It is not easy to say which of the cultures’ behaviors and ideas are “religious” 
and which are “cultural.” From dietary choices to ideas about relationships and marriage, about 
property, about punishment, religion and culture are for the most part inseparable. Furthermore, 
people are grouped not only by the choices they make but also by the way they are seen and treated by 
others. The racialization of religious minorities especially by others has a long and material history. As 
can be seen in any context where a person’s physical presentation or habits appear to be in contrast 
with typical societal norms as occurs with migrants, but also adoptees31, we are who we are seen to be. 
Our ethnicity is in a sense determined by what is mirrored back by the society that surrounds us. So 
when Rose says that the controversy “has nothing to do with racial issues because the difference 
between ethnicity and religion is you are free to choose your religion whereas you can’t choose the 
color of your skin,” he is already missing the way in which the ethnicity/religion dichotomy does not 
effectively pertain in the same way to Islam or Judaism as it might (or might not) to Protestant 
Christianity. The very notion of “choosing your religion” and keeping it “separate” makes sense 
within the Danish context as it is very much a product of the form of secularism in place subsequent 
to the Protestant Reformation. It is however in no way universal, not even within Europe. Finally, the 
strong tradition of aniconism in Islam makes it highly blasphemous in most Islamic traditions to 
visually depict Muhammad, something that is in total opposition to the omnipresence of Christian 
religious figures in every major square of every major European city. So here too, a Muslim icon does 
not have the same meaning to members of the faith as a Christian (or Jewish, for that matter) icon by 
a matter of kind rather than degree.32 With these two instances of dramatic disregard for what it is 
and means to be Muslim or Jewish, it is difficult to take seriously his insistence that his was an 
attempt at inclusion. If what he means by inclusion is assimilation, a cancelling out of one’s historical 
																																																								
30 Malek (2007). 
31 For an in-depth analysis of the cultural complications of international adoption, see (Ricca 2019). 
32 A brilliant and insightful analysis of the contrasts between Christianity and Islam that emerge with questions of 
freedom of expression in Europe can be found in Asad (et al) 2009. 
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identity in order to conform to the norms of the dominant society, that would be a different matter, 
but it would be utterly incongruous with his claim of offering “respect and recognition.”  
At an ideological level, the protection of freedom of expression and freedom of religion (or 
conscience or belief or even “good morals”) are undertaken to safeguard the flourishing of human 
beings. But the only way for freedoms to be meaningfully protected is if they remain free, free to 
differ from one context to another, free to mean different things to different people. It is for this 
reason that the ECtHR has placed such an emphasis on balancing rights and freedoms.33 One cannot 
treat a wide range of people “the same way” and expect the results to be egalitarian. The Facebook 
case sentence, as has been noted, does not minimally take any of these concerns into consideration 
since it is only focused on the applicability of the E-commerce directive to impose takedown 
requirements on hosting companies. Nevertheless, as I have been trying to show, European States 
have long been wrestling with how to manage defamation issues such that a just balancing of rights 
can be found. A review of one European country’s legislation on the matter may provide useful 
perspective. 
 
 
5. Italy: A Case Study 
 
Italy is interesting to consider in the matter of defamation because it has such a strong and clear 
religiously influenced history. Even limiting the observation to the 20th century and beyond, we note 
that the Lateran pact in 1929 established the State of Vatican City, seat of the Catholic church, and 
established Catholicism as the state religion. This relationship was not officially concluded until 
1984. There is no question, therefore, that defamation laws in Italy, particularly regarding defamation 
of religion, have been strongly influenced by this relationship. Indeed, a recent comparative study 
showed Italy to be one of just four European countries with laws in all the categories related to 
offense against religion: blasphemy, insults to religious beliefs or doctrines, interfering with religious 
worship and/or freedom of religion, sacrilege against an object of worship, and inciting 
discrimination or religious hatred. These laws, solidified by the fascist regime, were substantially 
reformed in 2006 under the rubric of a modification to all “Crimes of Opinion.”34 In general terms, 
the reform involved extending protection to religions other than the Catholic faith and reducing 
penalties from imprisonment to fines. The movement from an officially Catholic state to a secular 
one is fairly clear in the changes made in the law. It is interesting, however, to note the language that 
remains within the statutes. The laws refer to condotta vilipendiosa, which can be translated as insult or 
contempt, and which is considered a crime, defined in Criminal Code Articles 403, 404 and 405. 
These articles make a distinction between contempt and defamation of religions as opposed to 
defamation and offence to the sensibilities of believers. It is the religious sentiment of the organized 
community of believers that is protected rather than the specific creed of the denomination. As in 
																																																								
33 For an analysis of freedom of expression vs. freedom of religion that considers the legal cultural differences between the 
US and Europe, see Foster (2009), and for a spirited cultural comparison in the domain of hate speech, see Heinze, 
(2009). 
34 Law 24 February 2006, n. 85 Modifiche al Codice penale in materia di reati d’opinione (Changes to the penal code regarding 
crimes of opinion).  
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several other European legal systems, censorship is not permitted if the expression is deemed to be 
criticism that contributes to constructive social debate, distinguished from “mere derision, through 
rudeness and contempt.”35  
The Italian courts have of course addressed the interaction between these laws and Article 21 of 
the Constitution which guarantees freedom of expression, defining defamation of religion thus: 
contemptuous or insulting conduct against religious people, views, or objects constitutes an injury to 
the believer and therefore to his legal personality, as well as offence to the ethical values which 
substantiate and nourish the religious phenomenon, viewed objectively.36 This approach appears to 
be consistent with that underlying the Austrian case analyzed here, wherein the plaintiff’s claim of 
defamation, though not religious, is similarly conceived. And yet just as many American 
commentators struggled to understand Austria’s definition of defamation for this politician, it is far 
from easy to feel certain about what injury to a believer and therefore his/her legal subjectivity might 
entail, especially given a description of the religious phenomenon viewed “objectively.” How does a 
secular state understand the religious phenomenon objectively? At its very core, it is anything but 
objective since it pertains to transcendent interior experience and individual conscience, in addition 
to its public external praxis. Furthermore, conduct that may be experienced as religious either to a 
person enacting it or to a person observing it may exceed the typical categorization schemes assigned 
to religion. In other words, people who are religious do not contain their religiousness to places of 
worship; they live their religiousness within many aspects of their lives which certainly overlap with 
secular spaces. A secular state must attempt to protect the interests of all of its citizens, religious and 
non. It might seem that protecting religious phenomena would be more problematic than 
adjudicating non-religious defamation. Italian jurisprudence, however, does not quite support this 
hypothesis.   
For a state that has the general reputation of being unduly influenced by its history of 
entanglement with the Catholic church, the roster of legal cases in the domain of religious 
defamation is not terribly robust. The most recent case, in 2015, involved a seventy-two-year-old man 
who was convicted by the Italian Supreme Court for violating Criminal Code Article 403, offence 
against a religious denomination through the insult of a religious leader. The accused exhibited a 
large format triptych canvas in the center of Milan featuring Pope Benedict XVI, male genitalia, and 
Monseigneur Gaenswein, the Pope’s personal secretary, with a caption that read, “Let the person who 
is not a faggot cast the first stone.” The defendant argued that he had manifested his freedom of 
expression, despite its vulgarity. The Court ruled the speech act to be defamation because it was 
insulting in and of itself, meaning it was derisory without contributing to social criticism in a 
constructive way. Further, the Court found that there had been “injury beyond acceptable limits, 
taking into account the minimal respect due for other people’s religious beliefs.” It is not difficult to 
																																																								
35 Cited in Cianitto (2017) at Note 23.  
36 This is a translated paraphrase of a legal scholar Fabio Basile’s interpretation of the Constitutional Court’s ruling n. 
188 from 1975. Basile (2018). Translation mine. Furthermore, there is a massive literature in Italian on the intersection 
of freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the related legal issues in Italy. For a comprehensive overview of the 
domain, see Fuccillo (2019). For a very recent analysis of the protection of religious feeling and “crimes of opinion,” see 
Licastro (2020) and Adamo (2018). Blasphemy and hate speech with specific regard to religion are investigated by 
Cianitto (2016), Colaianni (2008) specifically addresses satire and religion, Angeletti (2010) defamation of religion and 
human rights, Siracusano (2009) pluralism and the secularism of values, while and references therein. 
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imagine such a case resulting in the same outcome even in states who place greater emphasis on 
freedom of speech than protection of religious feeling. Perhaps more relevant to the issues under 
analysis here are Italy’s laws regarding non-religious defamation, which have been severely criticized 
for dictating punishments that are among the harshest penalties in Europe.37 As one freedom of the 
press watchdog observes:  
 
According to data obtained by the Italian free expression group Ossigeno per l’Informazione, Italian courts annually sentence 
around 155 individuals, mostly journalists, to jail for defamation. Over the last five years, the sentences have added up to 
515 years of imprisonment. Although those jail sentences have been carried out in only a few cases – in others, convicts 
were sentenced to house arrest or had their jail terms suspended – their very existence has the potential to cast a chilling 
effect on journalism.38 
 
The question then is: why? Article 594 of the Criminal Code (reato di ingiuria), defines defamation as 
offending the honor of another person. Honor—for the purposes of defamation—refers to the moral 
qualities (honesty, loyalty, etc.), of the person offended.39 Though this may sound rather vague, the 
Austrian case under consideration is entirely consistent with this approach, since the offended 
politician was referred to as being corrupt and dishonest. Indeed, Article 21 of the Italian 
constitution, protecting freedom of expression, also invokes morality, stipulating that “Printed 
publications, shows and other displays contrary to morality are forbidden.” But how is morality to be 
defined? Who decides what is contrary to morality? Defamation penalties are more severe when the 
“audience” of the offense is larger, so there appears to be an idea nested within this concept of 
morality that pertains to community and reputation. Also relevant, again, are the issues of veracity 
and intentionality in these cases. Article 596 of the Criminal Code, “Inadmissibility of exonerating 
evidence,” stipulates that in cases of defamation, proving the truth or notoriety of the allegation does 
not absolve the offending party.40 So, the damage to reputation occurs regardless of the veracity of the 
allegation. Another interesting exception occurs in cases of retaliation, as defined in Article 599: 
“Persons having committed one of the acts described in Articles 594 and 595 in a state of anger 
which has been caused by an unjust act by a third party and is suffered after this act shall not be 
punishable.” Who is to decide what is an unjust act? Or whether a state of anger is justifiably caused 
by such? 
It could be speculated that the harsh penalties, the inclusion of provisions against offense to 
heads of state or objects of state (e.g. flags), the fact that veracity does not excuse the offense, etc., 
have their origins in the fascist period of Italian history and before that, in the time when religious 
leadership was tightly connected with the State. Or that there are religious roots to be found, for 
example, in the provisions regarding retaliation. It would take a much more extensive legal-historical 
analysis of the jurisprudence of defamation than this paper permits to effectively explore how and 
why these specific provisions have ended up in their current state. Pertinent to this analysis, however, 
is the cultural effervescence, if you will, that can easily be perceived in all of the legal terminology and 
																																																								
37 http://legaldb.freemedia.at/2018/01/30/defamation-laws-still-concern-for-europe-media/ 
38 Ibid.  
39 Extracted and translated from https://www.brocardi.it/dizionario/5244.html 
40 Persons committing the offences set out in the previous two articles are not permitted to exonerate themselves by 
proving the truth or notoriety of the alleged act performed by the defamed person. 
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the resulting impossibility of constructing globally accepted definitions. Reading the legal statutes and 
the cases that have put them to use there is a clearly discernable cultural fabric full of unspoken 
assumptions regarding proper (moral) conduct, honor, reputation, truth, audience, offense, and 
more, whether religion is a factor or not. A closer look at intent, legally defined, may be helpful here. 
Intent, in the legal context, must be finalized after the legal facts have taken place. Definitions 
regarding the action and the actor have already occurred when legal proceedings begin. The accused 
enters the courtroom as an accused person, someone who is being characterized as a wrong doer, if 
not a criminal, even if formally he is innocent until proven guilty. Thus, the person accused of 
defamation is already being seen in terms of the defaming act. Motive or intention are already woven 
into these qualifications. There is very little space, if any, for an inquiry into the massive web of 
variables from which the act emerged. Whereas outside the legal context, understanding a person’s 
intent for a given action might be a highly complex and time-consuming process, conducting 
extended research on intent is not really within the purview of the court. This is not to say that legal 
qualification of intent is casual, quite the opposite. There are several different qualifications for 
intent, or dolus, in the Italian (criminal) legal system as in many other systems, and which one is 
applied has a crucial bearing on legal outcomes.  
The history of the term is revealing. While dolo dates back to ancient Roman law, its original 
definition was deceit, or fraud. Dolus malus specifies that the aim of the deceit is reprehensible or 
immoral, while dolus bonus identifies the aim as meritorious. These definitions are still part of legal 
qualification today. What changed in the 18th century, however, is an extension of the qualification of 
dolo to include not just deceit but any conduct intentionally undertaken with the awareness of 
wrongdoing, in short, the modern idea of intent.41 This leads then to the refinements dolus directus, in 
which the accused is believed to have objectively foreseen the consequences of the act, and dolus 
eventualis, in which the accused is believed to have had an awareness of the likely outcome of an 
action. One of the inescapable difficulties of all of these qualifications, however, is that they are made 
after the fact, or the object of analysis. Once again, the blurred lines across expression and religious 
factors help demonstrate why this process is difficult: if a person insults the Pope (as in the case 
above), was the intention necessarily to offend Catholics in their religious beliefs? To add some 
additional perspective, the events of 2016 showcased Europeans loudly proclaiming the 
unacceptability of Muslims taking offense at insults of the Prophet Mohammed.42 Does an insult to a 
religious figure always constitute a deliberate offense to believers? If so, which kind of offense? If the 
qualification of intent is too general, there is a risk of constant litigation that overtaxes legal systems 
and results in a disproportionate use of legal resources. If, on the other hand, the qualification is too 
specific, the risk becomes that no one is ever held responsible. So, there are those who would say that 
qualifying a brief online insult of a politician as defamation (damaging of reputation with dolus 
generalis) is too broad and puts it in direct contrast with fundamental rights of freedom of expression. 
																																																								
41 It is unlikely that this timing is a coincidence. The entire ethos of the 18th century in Europe was saturated in a 
solidification of the triumph of human free will and reason over the previously shackling chains of religion. It seems more 
than fitting that intent, precisely at this historical moment, becomes solidified in the legal system as fundamental to the 
adjudication of right and wrong. 
42 Again, an excellent and multifaceted anthropological and sociological analysis of these events is offered by Asad et al 
(2009). 
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The more specific qualifications often required, however, have raised strong objections in the ever-
expanding area of hate speech, instances of which have led to serious consequences beyond the 
speech itself. 43  A just assessment of intent would seek to find a middle ground. This already 
monumental task, however, is aggravated by the relentlessly increasing pluralism of modern societies. 
The notion of a “global culture” feels more like an oxymoron than a goal to strive for.  
The “cultural factor,” moreover, is in some sense a further complication of an already deeply 
complex situation. The moment of adjudication showcases a debilitating hurdle: the impossibility of 
determining subsequent to its occurrence the “fact” on which the legal definitions will rest. What we 
call “the fact” which sets legal processes in motion is already a synthesis between objective and 
subjective aspects of human conduct. It is not only intent that slips easily out of our grasp within legal 
assessments, but the very acts themselves. A small example may be useful here. A man is driving a car. 
Suddenly the car swerves wildly across the road. In this action, a child who was crossing the road has 
been spared. The car, however, has run over a person walking on the sidewalk. It is then revealed that 
the man driving was in the midst of a carjacking, and had a gun pointed to his head as he drove. It is 
then discovered that the carjacker was a woman, running away from her husband who was trying to 
kill her. Then we discover that the driver was deaf and could not hear anything the woman was saying 
to him. Or that the driver was the brother of the abusive husband. Infinite layers can be added to the 
scenario, but what are the facts of the case? Is it murder? Self-defense? Is the driver a hero for saving 
the girl? A murderer for killing the pedestrian? Exclusively a victim of a violent crime? Is the man a 
driver or a hostage? Is the car a vehicle or a weapon? What if the gun used was a toy gun? This 
example may seem extreme, but these kinds of layers of complication are daily realities in legal cases. 
Is the person posting an insult conducting defamation or political protest? A journalist or a traitor? 
To arrive at legal qualifications, understanding must be reached of factual circumstances, but the two 
are co-constitutive. When an offense occurs, the facts that make it an offense are not solid or 
immutable but instead change depending on the perspective of who is viewing them. Legal categories, 
for their part, inevitably change over time as they adjust to evolving human conduct. What I am 
calling perspective is created and sustained by culture. Categories like “driver,” “hostage,” and 
“weapon” are not flat but instead operate like placeholders or icons beneath which lie universes of 
meaning, checklists of attributes that are at times included, at others excluded. A previous axiological 
assessment had to be made in the initial act of category creation and is subsequently made each time 
the category is invoked. Again, those assessments are made within cultures. Thus, to understand facts 
and qualify them is an inescapably cultural act, and culture is not objective. There is no perspective 
“from nowhere”; all perspective is from somewhere. It is always historically and sociologically imbued. 
When the German philosopher Gadamer wrote his magnum opus Truth and Method, one of his 
key conclusions was of course that the “historical stream” in which we find ourselves permeates our 
understanding, it is always within us, and cannot be separated from the “methods” we use to make 
sense of the world and of each other.44 Law, as a method for regulating societies, is certainly no 
exception. The imbrication and entanglement of means and ends is intrinsic to every task of law. 
Methods and solutions that rest at the extreme ends of a spectrum do not appear to be very effective 
when addressing the issues that straddle domains such as freedom of expression and freedom of 
																																																								
43 Italy report of hate speech crimes. 
44 Gadamer (2013). 
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religion. If we recognize that it is impossible to pre-determine a divide between  factual and legal 
qualification, then perhaps the task is to work on separating the two as a cultural operation, to 
subtract or subjectivize values and ends before evaluating behavior, to find the culture(s) within and 
without before the judgment is made. Most likely it is an operation that needs to take place long 
before the case is brought before the judge.45  
 
 
6. Magic Filters and Global Takedowns  
 
I have tried to argue that there are important overlooked assumptions and ramifications for the 
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland decision regarding the imposition of one culture’s values over a 
vast array of others. There are, however, also straightforward logistical issues with the decision coming 
from a perhaps limited understanding of the current state of online content filtering tools. Probably 
in an attempt to not overtax entities like Facebook who are now being made responsible for the 
takedown of content deemed defamatory, the judgment specifies that content monitoring should be 
done exclusively using technology rather than assigned human personnel. This approach to content 
filtering has led to widespread criticism from human rights and free speech advocacy groups who 
point out that filters fail to cope with understanding context, often flagging legitimate expression for 
takedown46 or bypassing impermissible content. Facebook itself has long understood the importance 
of human monitoring of content; it has been reported that they have hired 15,000 people for the 
task.47 Yet even this highly controlled approach to monitoring has been unable to prevent lawsuits 
and controversy across over a dozen categories including intellectual property infringement, violent 
content, incitement of terrorism, fake news, trolling, anti-Semitism and white supremacist content. 
Facebook was recently in the spotlight when it was discovered that it took down hundreds of videos 
of people expressing political opinions that were actually facsimiles, that is, purely digital 
constructions known as “deep fakes.” Video production technology has become so advanced that it is 
no longer possible to distinguish “real” from “fake” video with the naked eye.48  There have even been 
studies showing that groups suffering discrimination “offline” are disproportionately affected by 
content takedown online.49 It is almost unnecessary to point out that automated filters are not up to 
the extremely complex task of monitoring the relentless stream of content posted by a quarter of the 
world’s population.  
 Understanding filtering technology and its limitations, however, may be the least of the 
problems in this domain. The bigger issue, it would seem, is the global interconnectedness of all 
																																																								
45 For a recent rigorous analysis of the relationship between reasonableness and rationality in the law and the importance 
of intercultural analysis and translation before cases are adjudicated, see Ricca (forthcoming). For a classic and eloquent 
analysis of the challenges of the judge when facing factual vs. legal qualification, see Hutcheson (1929). 
46 See SIN v. Facebook, in which a Polish non-profit organization promoting evidence-based drug policy filed suit against 
Facebook for taking down content related to its educational campaigns on the harmful consequences of drug use. 
47 https://www.npr.org/2019/03/02/699663284/the-working-lives-of-facebooks-content-moderators 
48  https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ywyxex/deepfake-of-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-fake-video-policy. YouTube 
similarly came under attack for removing videos documenting the Syrian war. 
49  https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/offlineonline-project-highlights-how-oppression-marginalized-communities-
face-real 
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content online. As one journalist put it, “Facebook understands that there are cultural and historical 
nuances in different countries, but still fundamentally sees the internet—and itself—as a borderless 
platform.”50 They are not wrong. One legal commentator downplaying the negative reactions to 
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland argued that the ruling does not actually impose worldwide 
effects, but instead does not prevent them, simply remaining silent on the desirability of such 
injunctions or their potential effect in worldwide digital trade.51 This is said to be the right approach 
since the CJEU lacks jurisdiction on the worldwide effects of international law. While technically this 
is true, it is difficult to see how, from a user perspective, worldwide effects are not imposed, 
nevertheless. It remains the case that in Austria, a post about a politician was deemed to be 
defamatory and around the world that post was taken down. The real-world international impact of 
these kinds of decision cannot be overlooked. Whether the law stipulates it or not, through the sheer 
force of its membership numbers, Facebook has tremendous power over what is and is not allowed 
online. Concerns have been raised regarding the absence of a mechanism for contesting takedowns or 
even account bans.52 Significant action has been taken against Facebook for lack of transparency; in 
July of 2019, German authorities fined Facebook 2 million euros for under-reporting complaints 
about illegal content on its social media platform in breach of the country’s law on internet 
transparency. These contrasts demonstrate how the very concept of nation in some sense dissolves 
when it comes to the Internet. The spatial continuum of the online world creates a daily 
contamination of language and culture that keeps cultural values in constant motion and makes 
clashing perspectives inevitable. Is it, then, feasible or desirable to try to block information flow based 
on culturally specific, technologically imposed, inadequate filters and culturally determined laws? As 
one commentator pointed out, Facebook’s content policy’s reflect the American cultural values of its 
founder and home base, but Americans and Canadians make up only 17% of the total user base.53 
Even when it comes to apparently simple issues such as data privacy as seen in “Safe harbor”54 laws, 
these depend on people showing ‘good faith’ efforts. Who is going to decide what “good faith” is? 
What should it be in an unescapably globally interconnected world? 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
50 https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/xwk9zd/how-facebook-content-moderation-works 
51  https://euinternetpolicy.wordpress.com/2019/10/04/the-cjeu-facebook-judgment-on-filtering-with-global-effect-
clarifying-some-misunderstandings/ 
52 https://qz.com/651001/getting-banned-from-facebook-can-have-unexpected-and-professionally-devastating-
consequences/ 
53 Ibid.  
54 Safe Harbor was the name of an agreement between the US Department of Justice and the EU regulating the way US 
companies could export and handle the personal data of European citizens. The goal was to provide a single set of data 
protection requirements. In 2015, the ECJ overturned the agreement, ruling that each of the 28 European countries 
should determine how their citizens’ online information can be collected and used. In 2016, the European Commission 
and US Department of Commerce established a new legal framework for transatlantic data flows, the EU-US Privacy 
Shield. See https://searchcio.techtarget.com/definition/Safe-Harbor 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The legal management of values-driven sanctions in the digital world calls for a more interculturally 
informed approach. Freedoms such as expression; choosing your religion; practicing your religion; 
determining what are facts and truth; being protected from harassment or misrepresentation; taking 
responsibility for silencing defamation or hate speech, are no longer living isolated within individual 
states. We cannot ignore that the impact of commercial providers is a fait accomplit, nor can we 
depend on technology or even transnational technology-based agreements to solve online conflicts. 
Every instance of conflict online reveals how culturally determined values lurk within regulation. 
Even the issue of fake news (too large to take on meaningfully in this paper, but relevant nonetheless) 
brings up questions of education, and therefore of values. Where the responsibility for the education 
of citizens lies with regard to online information is unclear, but only education can truly de-fuel the 
motor of fake news. It would seem that if there is to be any possibility for an egalitarian interface to 
determine laws (if there are to be laws) to help govern, or at least manage the world online, 
international agreements on human rights will need to play some role. Continuing to mutely impose 
the cultural frameworks of one nation on all the others will not be sustainable as human interaction 
borders continue to dissolve. 
There may be some hope to be found in taking a more spatially aware perspective. If law, 
communication, subjectivity and ultimately the meaning we find in life could be understood as 
actually global issues, it might help guide some small concrete steps forward. With the incredible 
access we have now to the deep thinking of philosophers and merchants alike, might we not begin to 
elaborate a sort of collection or list of strategies for facing the spatial-geographical spectacle of our 
society?  Might we not grow and apply our cultural skillsets to the problems of legal regulation and 
sanction? Are there not ways of thinking about prevention that might help head off conflicts in 
multiple cultural contexts before they become crimes? If the real, everyday scope of our experience is 
not reflected by our laws, they will cease to have any effectiveness. And yet legal practitioners —at 
least, sometimes—are already finding solutions to their clients’ conundrums before they become 
offenses.55 Online giants are working together to try to understand how to balance freedom of 
expression and offensive speech56. International consortiums are identifying best practices online that 
similarly seek balance, between privacy and access, between expression and safety. The first step, in 
my humble opinion, is to acknowledge the presence of culture. Anthropological analysis is useful for 
all human communities, not only tribes in Micronesia.  
In order to be effective, such an analytical approach will require moving beyond the 
fetishization and ghettoization of cultures in which only the most contrasting morphological 
differences are paid any attention, and then only to be quieted down with temporary 
accommodations that leave existing power structures intact. Taking cultural difference seriously 
means engaging it reciprocally and at the molecular level. The disparities between freedom of 
expression allowances in the US vs Europe, for example, are the products of long historical processes 
																																																								
55 Ricca (2015). 
56 The European Commission's “Code of Conduct for Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online” commits companies to 
removing reported hate speech within 24 hours from Facebook, Twitter, Microsoft and YouTube. Document available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/code_of_conduct_on_countering_illegal_hate_speech_online_en.pdf 
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that should be untangled and better understood. The scars left upon the face of Europe by World 
War II have inevitably shaped what it means today to protect people from hate speech and have 
undoubtedly inspired laws that demand a balancing between freedom of expression and what legal 
instruments call human dignity. The US, in line with its capitalist history, has instead nurtured a 
fervent desire to protect a free marketplace of ideas, to which any kind of censorship is anathema. 
These kinds of conceptions need to be examined not only for how they came to be, but also in view 
of what their historical threads have tangibly wrought in the form of laws and regulations. A case in 
point is the “Right to be Forgotten” controversy57. Here, the rights to freedom of expression and of 
access to information are pitted against the right to privacy. But \ either floating above or lying 
beneath are overlapping ideas about the right to dignity and the free development of personality, the 
right to safety and security, and the right to earn a living without discrimination, among others. 
Before the Internet revolution, cultures could make their own determinations, relatively 
autonomously about what was to be ceded to history and what was to be held fast and firm before us, 
lest it be forgotten. Now, technology remembers everything indiscriminately. Some say this is a good 
thing, others a menace.58 In Europe, the courts have found in favor of plaintiffs wishing to be 
“forgotten” online and supporting the removal of evidence of past conduct from indexing engines. In 
the US, instead, people have been fired or denied graduation for past conduct evidenced online.59 
The only certainty is that these determinations are inescapably cultural. We will need culturally aware 
practices of semiotic exploration that benefit from the knowledge gained in these first digital rights 
forays if we are to renovate the legal categories required for adjudication.  
Even in the West, we have some magic formulas at our disposal, I think (hope), we just need to 
learn a more modest and aware use of them. If we look at Article 26 of the UDHR on the right to 
education and its reference to “the full development of the human personality and to the 
strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,” we find a vision for education 
that promotes “understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious 
groups.” Parents are also to have the right to choose the kind of education given to their children. For 
many around the world the Internet is a tool that is paramount to daily education in all of these 
senses. Neither an unfettered unmonitored avalanche of expression nor a tightly regulated control 
would seem to support this vision of education. Instead, these broadly expressed rights can serve as 
umbrella terms, of sorts, that can be broken down into their constituent parts. The full development 
of human personality is an idea that finds general agreement in modern societies, and internet 
technologies provide ample fuel for such development. In a globally networked world, however, we 
need intercultural translation to help us make sense of the how and what of human development in 
																																																								
57 The landmark case that caught international attention on the issue was Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González in which the defendant successfully petitioned for Google to remove 
information about his past debts from their indexing engine, as the information was no longer current or relevant. Court 
of Justice press release available at: 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/cp140070en.pdf. Similar movements and laws have 
taken root in Franace and Argentina. 
58 One reporter captured this malaise succinctly: “The fact that the Internet never seems to forget is threatening, at an 
almost existential level, our ability to control our identities; to preserve the option of reinventing ourselves and starting 
anew; to overcome our checkered pasts.” Rosen (2010). 
59 Snyder v. Millersville University et al.  
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societies with wildly diverse cultural contexts. Single solutions branded across vast territories are 
unlikely to be successful. The law has the wonderful potential to make and unmake solutions, to keep 
pace with cultural changes as they occur, to suss out what is needed to preserve both the wonderful 
opportunities that are part of online life as well as how to protect people from its dangers. It needs 
eyes open to culture. It needs the desire to translate. 
The jurist, we might say, is not unlike the sorcerer’s apprentice, performing spells whose 
consequences he has not been able to imagine. Marx and Engels used the same analogy to criticize 
modern bourgeois society as being like, “a sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the 
nether world whom he has called up by his spells.”60 My slight adjustment would be that it is not a 
nether world from which these powers come, but our very own world, which we make, undo, and 
remake every day. Human imagination is outrageously abundant, if only we put it to good use.  
  
																																																								
60 Marx and Engels (2009, 1848). 
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